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Intuition	  in	  Mathematics	  Elijah	  Chudnoff	  	  Abstract:	  The	  literature	  on	  mathematics	  suggests	  that	  intuition	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  it	  as	  a	  ground	  of	  belief.	  This	  article	  explores	  the	  nature	  of	  intuition	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  mathematical	  thinking.	  Section	  1	  suggests	  that	  intuitions	  should	  be	  understood	  by	  analogy	  with	  perceptions.	  Section	  2	  explains	  what	  fleshing	  out	  such	  an	  analogy	  requires.	  Section	  3	  discusses	  Kantian	  ways	  of	  fleshing	  it	  out.	  Section	  4	  discusses	  Platonist	  ways	  of	  fleshing	  it	  out.	  Section	  5	  sketches	  a	  proposal	  for	  resolving	  the	  main	  problem	  facing	  Platonists—the	  problem	  of	  explaining	  how	  our	  experiences	  make	  contact	  with	  mathematical	  reality.	  	  	  	   If	  you	  look	  at	  the	  literature	  on	  mathematics—the	  prefaces	  to	  math	  textbooks,	  discussion	  pieces	  by	  mathematicians,	  mathematical	  popularizations	  and	  biographies,	  philosophical	  works	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  mathematics,	  psychological	  studies	  of	  mathematical	  cognition,	  educational	  material	  on	  the	  teaching	  of	  mathematics—you	  will	  regularly	  find	  talk	  about	  intuition.	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  some	  role	  intuition	  plays	  in	  mathematics,	  specifically	  as	  a	  ground	  of	  belief	  about	  mathematical	  matters.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  present	  chapter	  is	  to	  stake	  out	  some	  ideas	  about	  how	  best	  to	  understand	  intuition	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  mathematics,	  i.e.	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  mathematical	  intuition.	  	  	   A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  textbooks,	  discussion	  pieces,	  popularizations	  and	  biographies,	  philosophical	  works,	  psychological	  studies,	  and	  educational	  material	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reveals,	  however,	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  notions	  that	  correspond	  to	  talk	  about	  mathematical	  intuition.	  The	  first	  order	  of	  business	  will	  be	  to	  draw	  some	  distinctions	  between	  these	  notions	  and	  pick	  an	  appropriate	  focus	  for	  our	  present	  inquiry.	  That	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  section	  1.	  The	  notion	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  is	  one	  according	  to	  which	  mathematical	  intuition	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  experience	  that	  is	  like	  sensory	  perception	  in	  giving	  its	  subjects	  non-­‐inferential	  access	  to	  a	  world	  of	  facts,	  but	  different	  from	  sensory	  perception	  in	  that	  the	  facts	  are	  about	  abstract	  mathematical	  objects	  rather	  than	  concrete	  material	  objects.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  of	  intuition.	  It	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	  conception	  of	  mathematical	  intuition	  in	  the	  western	  philosophical	  tradition	  since	  Plato,	  and	  the	  alternatives	  one	  finds	  all	  more	  or	  less	  derive	  from	  it,	  in	  ways	  to	  be	  indicated	  below.	  	  	   After	  distinguishing	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  of	  intuition	  from	  some	  others	  to	  be	  set	  aside,	  the	  plan	  is	  as	  follows.	  In	  section	  2,	  I	  will	  sketch	  some	  ideas	  about	  perception,	  by	  reference	  to	  which	  we	  can	  flesh	  out	  the	  analogy	  between	  mathematical	  intuition	  and	  perception.	  In	  sections	  3	  and	  4,	  I	  explore	  the	  two	  main	  approaches	  to	  doing	  this	  in	  the	  philosophical	  literature—what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  Kantian	  and	  the	  Platonist	  views.	  Kantians	  face	  the	  problem	  that	  mathematical	  subject	  matter	  outstrips	  our	  sensory	  capacities.	  Platonists	  face	  the	  problem	  of	  accounting	  for	  how	  our	  experiences	  can	  be	  in	  contact	  with	  mathematical	  reality.	  In	  section	  5,	  I	  sketch	  some	  ideas	  about	  how	  a	  Platonist	  might	  resolve	  this	  issue.	  	  	  	   1.	  Preliminary	  Distinctions	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Consider	  the	  following:	  	  	   [a]	  …it	  is	  my	  opinion	  that,	  in	  our	  naïve	  intuition,	  when	  thinking	  of	  a	  point	  we	  do	  not	  picture	  to	  our	  mind	  an	  abstract	  mathematical	  point,	  but	  substitute	  something	  concrete	  for	  it.	  In	  imagining	  a	  line,	  we	  do	  not	  picture	  to	  ourselves	  ‘length	  without	  breadth’,	  but	  a	  strip	  of	  a	  certain	  width.	  Now	  such	  a	  strip	  has	  of	  course	  always	  a	  tangent,	  i.e.	  we	  can	  always	  imagine	  a	  straight	  strip	  having	  a	  small	  position	  (element)	  in	  common	  with	  the	  curved	  strip…	  (Felix	  Klein	  in	  Ewald	  1996	  pg	  959).	  	   [b]	  But,	  despite	  their	  remoteness	  from	  sense	  experience,	  we	  do	  have	  something	  like	  a	  perception	  also	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  set	  theory,	  as	  is	  seen	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  axioms	  force	  themselves	  upon	  us	  as	  being	  true.	  I	  don’t	  see	  any	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  have	  less	  confidence	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  perception,	  i.e.,	  in	  mathematical	  intuition,	  than	  in	  sense	  perception….	  (Gödel	  2001	  pg	  268).	  	  	  	   [c]	  I	  would	  like	  to	  argue,	  however,	  that	  recent	  research	  in	  numerical	  cognition	  fleshes	  out	  a	  concept	  of	  intuition,	  at	  least	  within	  the	  small	  domain	  of	  elementary	  arithmetic.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  a	  sense	  of	  number	  is	  part	  of	  Homo	  sapiens’	  core	  knowledge,	  present	  early	  on	  in	  infancy,	  and	  with	  a	  reproducible	  cerebral	  substrate…Its	  operation	  obeys	  three	  criteria	  that	  may	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be	  seen	  as	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  “intuition”:	  it	  is	  fast,	  automatic,	  and	  inaccessible	  to	  introspection.	  (Dehaene	  2009	  pg	  233).	  	  	  	  One	  point	  common	  to	  all	  of	  the	  passages	  is	  that	  mathematical	  intuitions	  are	  experiences	  in	  which	  a	  proposition	  seems	  true.	  Say	  you	  intuit	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	  Then	  you	  have	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  it	  seems	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	  Beyond	  this	  point	  of	  agreement,	  however,	  the	  kinds	  of	  experience	  described	  in	  passages	  [a],	  [b],	  and	  [c]	  are	  quite	  different.	  	  According	  to	  Felix	  Klein	  in	  passage	  [a]	  when	  you	  intuit	  that	  p	  what	  you	  do	  is	  imagine—specifically	  visualize—concrete	  illustrations	  of	  the	  abstract	  subject	  matter	  of	  p.	  Let’s	  call	  this	  the	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  concrete	  illustration.	  According	  to	  Kurt	  Gödel	  in	  passage	  [b]	  when	  you	  intuit	  that	  p	  you	  have	  an	  experience	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  a	  sensory	  perception:	  in	  it	  the	  abstract	  subject	  matter	  of	  p	  itself—not	  merely	  a	  concrete	  illustration	  of	  the	  abstract	  subject	  matter	  of	  p—is	  present	  to	  mind.	  This	  is	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  of	  intuition	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction.	  	  A	  proponent	  of	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  is	  taking	  on	  a	  stronger	  commitment	  than	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  concrete	  illustration.	  Why	  bother?	  The	  main	  motivation,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  understand	  the	  ground	  of	  intuitive	  knowledge	  as	  analogous	  to	  the	  ground	  of	  perceptual	  knowledge.	  Suppose	  you	  know	  by	  sight	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  the	  mailbox.	  A	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  perceptual	  knowledge	  is	  that	  it	  derives	  in	  part	  from	  your	  visual	  awareness	  of	  the	  mail.	  Why	  the	  mail?	  Because	  that	  is,	  in	  part,	  what	  your	  knowledge	  is	  about.	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Now	  suppose	  you	  know	  by	  mathematical	  intuition	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	  An	  analogous	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  intuitive	  knowledge	  is	  that	  it	  derives	  in	  part	  from	  your	  intuitive	  awareness	  of	  something	  like	  circularity.	  Why	  circularity?	  Because	  that	  is,	  in	  part,	  what	  your	  knowledge	  is	  about.	  	  Why	  not	  some	  concrete	  illustration	  of	  circularity?	  Because	  that	  is	  not,	  even	  in	  part,	  what	  your	  knowledge	  is	  about.1	  If	  all	  you	  were	  aware	  of	  were	  a	  concrete	  illustration	  of	  circularity,	  then,	  plausibly,	  you	  would	  have	  to	  make	  some	  inference	  from	  what	  you	  are	  able	  to	  discern	  about	  it	  to	  the	  proposition	  about	  circularity	  itself.	  In	  this	  case	  your	  knowledge	  would	  not	  be	  wholly	  based	  on	  mathematical	  intuition.	  Compare	  the	  case	  in	  which	  instead	  of	  seeing	  mail	  in	  your	  mailbox	  you	  see	  the	  mailman	  driving	  away.	  You	  might	  still	  come	  to	  know	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  your	  mailbox.	  In	  this	  case,	  however,	  your	  knowledge	  does	  not	  wholly	  derive	  from	  perception,	  but	  in	  part	  from	  inference:	  you	  infer	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  your	  mailbox	  from	  your	  perceptual	  knowledge	  that	  the	  mailman	  is	  driving	  away.	  Surely	  we	  do	  make	  inferences	  both	  about	  our	  environment	  and	  about	  mathematical	  reality.	  But	  sometimes	  we	  also	  seem	  to	  know	  without	  having	  to	  make	  an	  inference.	  Traditionally,	  perception	  and	  mathematical	  intuition	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  sources	  of	  this	  non-­‐inferential	  knowledge.	  So	  there	  is	  some	  motivation	  for	  taking	  on	  board	  the	  stronger	  commitment	  of	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  of	  intuition.	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  of	  intuition,	  however,	  might	  also	  privilege	  visual	  imagination,	  for	  they	  might	  think	  that	  it	  is	  always	  necessary	  to	  use	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  proposition	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters	  implies	  propositions	  about	  concrete	  illustrations	  of	  circles—e.g.	  that	  concrete	  illustrations	  of	  circles	  will,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  drawn	  accurately,	  be	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	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visual	  imagination	  as	  a	  means	  to	  gaining	  intuitive	  awareness	  of	  abstract	  objects.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  Kant’s	  view	  of	  mathematical	  intuition,	  which	  I	  discuss	  below.	  	  Finally,	  according	  to	  Stanislas	  Dehaene	  in	  passage	  [c]	  when	  you	  intuit	  that	  p	  what	  happens	  is	  that	  you	  have	  the	  spontaneous	  impression	  that	  p—an	  impression	  that	  is	  fast,	  automatic,	  and	  introspectively	  opaque.	  Let’s	  call	  this	  the	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  spontaneous	  impression.	  This	  view	  of	  intuition—as	  it	  occurs	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  of	  mathematical	  contexts—is	  common	  among	  cognitive	  psychologists;	  for	  a	  helpful	  overview	  see	  Daniel	  Kahneman’s	  Nobel	  Prize	  speech	  (Kahneman	  2002)	  from	  which	  I	  have	  borrowed	  the	  term	  “impression.”	  However,	  even	  if	  some	  of	  the	  experiences	  we	  rely	  on	  in	  forming	  mathematical	  beliefs	  come	  to	  us	  as	  spontaneous	  impressions,	  most	  do	  not.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  proposition	  that	  between	  any	  circle	  and	  any	  point	  outside	  of	  it	  there	  are	  exactly	  two	  tangents.	  Brief	  reflection	  should	  make	  this	  obvious—but	  note	  that	  it	  likely	  does	  take	  some	  reflection,	  unless,	  say,	  you	  are	  recalling	  it	  from	  memory.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  mathematical	  intuitions	  conceived	  of	  as	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  suggests.	  The	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  concrete	  illustration	  and	  the	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  spontaneous	  impression	  both	  pick	  out	  real	  phenomena	  worth	  exploring.	  But	  here	  is	  a	  working	  hypothesis	  that	  seems	  plausible	  to	  me:	  the	  phenomena	  they	  pick	  out	  answer	  to	  partial	  rather	  than	  complete	  conceptions	  of	  mathematical	  intuition.	  The	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  concrete	  illustration	  focuses	  on	  a	  
partial	  aspect	  of	  some	  mathematical	  intuitions,	  namely	  the	  use	  of	  visual	  imagination	  as	  a	  means	  to	  awareness	  of	  the	  abstract	  subject	  matter	  of	  mathematical	  propositions.	  If	  we	  focused	  on	  this,	  we	  would	  be	  focusing	  on	  the	  means	  not	  the	  end,	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namely	  an	  intuition	  that	  involves	  awareness	  of	  mathematical	  subject	  matter.	  The	  view	  of	  intuition	  as	  spontaneous	  impression	  focuses	  on	  a	  special	  subclass	  of	  mathematical	  intuitions,	  namely	  mathematical	  intuitions	  that	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  those	  general	  purpose	  cognitive	  abilities	  we	  exercise	  in	  reflection,	  and	  so	  that	  are	  more	  amenable	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  investigation	  that	  has	  proved	  most	  fruitful	  in	  cognitive	  psychology.	  If	  we	  focused	  on	  this,	  we	  would	  be	  focusing	  on	  a	  special	  sort	  of	  mathematical	  intuition,	  not	  mathematical	  intuition	  in	  general.	  	  	   2.	  Perception	  and	  Intuition	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  perceptualist	  view	  of	  intuition,	  mathematical	  intuitions	  are	  similar	  to	  sensory	  perceptions	  in	  some	  respects,	  and	  different	  in	  other	  respects.	  The	  quote	  from	  Gödel	  gives	  some	  indications	  about	  these	  points	  of	  similarity	  and	  difference.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  bring	  them	  into	  better	  focus,	  and	  the	  natural	  place	  to	  start	  is	  with	  some	  observations	  about	  sensory	  perception.	  	  	   Sensory	  perception	  is	  a	  way	  of	  gaining	  information	  about	  your	  immediate	  environment.	  For	  example,	  you	  might	  see	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  your	  mailbox.	  Consider	  this	  perception.	  There	  are	  two	  features	  of	  it	  that	  I	  want	  to	  highlight.	  	  	   The	  first	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  its	  phenomenology—what	  the	  perception	  feels	  like	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  John	  Foster	  suggests	  a	  nice	  way	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  feature	  I	  have	  in	  mind.	  Imagine	  a	  blind	  person	  with	  the	  power	  of	  clairvoyance,	  limited,	  say,	  to	  what	  would	  be	  in	  his	  visual	  field	  if	  he	  weren’t	  blind.	  He	  can’t	  see	  his	  immediate	  environment,	  but	  he	  can	  immediately	  tell	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  it	  by	  appropriately	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directing	  his	  clairvoyant	  powers.	  His	  power	  of	  clairvoyance	  is,	  like	  sensory	  perception,	  a	  way	  of	  gaining	  information	  about	  his	  immediate	  environment.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  difference:	  	  	   When	  I	  seem	  to	  be	  clairvoyantly	  aware	  of	  some	  perception	  of	  the	  colour-­‐arrangement	  in	  my	  environment,	  how	  do	  my	  experiences	  differ	  in	  character	  from	  the	  visual	  experiences	  which	  occur	  when	  I	  use	  my	  eyes?	  The	  answer	  is	  that,	  in	  the	  clairvoyant	  cases	  as	  envisaged,	  there	  is	  no	  provision	  for	  the	  
presentational	  feel	  of	  phenomenal	  [i.e.	  perceptual]	  experience—for	  the	  subjective	  impression	  that	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  relevant	  type	  of	  environmental	  situation	  is	  directly	  presented.	  (Foster	  2000	  pg	  112).	  	  As	  Foster	  points	  out,	  there	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  difference	  between	  learning	  about	  your	  immediate	  environment	  by	  sight	  and	  learning	  about	  your	  immediate	  environment	  by	  clairvoyance.	  If	  you	  learn	  by	  clairvoyance	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  the	  mailbox	  you	  just	  gain	  the	  conviction	  that	  this	  is	  so.	  It	  is	  like	  suddenly	  becoming	  convinced	  that	  the	  mail	  is	  there	  without	  even	  opening	  the	  mailbox.	  But	  if	  you	  learn	  by	  sight	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  the	  mailbox	  you	  do	  not	  just	  gain	  the	  conviction,	  you	  also	  see	  what	  makes	  the	  conviction	  true—namely	  the	  mail,	  sitting	  there	  in	  the	  mailbox.	  That	  is	  the	  “relevant	  type	  of	  environmental	  situation.”	  	  	   In	  general,	  perceptual	  experiences	  have	  presentational	  phenomenology:	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Whenever	  you	  have	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  representing	  that	  p—e.g.	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  the	  mailbox—your	  perceptual	  experience	  also	  makes	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  as	  if	  you	  are	  sensorily	  aware	  of	  items	  in	  your	  environment	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  p	  is	  true—e.g.	  the	  mail,	  sitting	  there	  in	  the	  mailbox.2	  	  	  	  This	  property	  of	  perception	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  guessing	  that	  p,	  having	  a	  premonition	  that	  p,	  supposing	  that	  p,	  receiving	  testimony	  that	  p,	  and	  knowing	  by	  clairvoyance	  that	  p.	  These	  other	  experiences	  do	  not	  have	  presentational	  phenomenology.	  	  	  	   So	  far	  we	  have	  focused	  on	  what	  your	  perception	  feels	  like	  from	  the	  inside.	  Suppose	  you	  hallucinate	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  your	  mailbox.	  From	  the	  inside	  this	  experience	  feels	  just	  like	  seeing	  that	  there	  is	  mail	  in	  your	  mailbox.	  So	  it	  also	  has	  presentational	  phenomenology,	  but	  its	  presentational	  phenomenology	  is	  not	  veridical:	  you	  seem	  to	  see	  the	  mail,	  sitting	  there	  in	  the	  mailbox,	  but	  you	  do	  not	  really	  see	  it	  there.	  Fortunately,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  norm.	  And	  the	  perception	  we	  started	  with	  was	  not	  a	  hallucination.	  What	  makes	  the	  difference?	  	  	   At	  least	  part	  of	  the	  answer	  is	  that	  when	  you	  perceive	  the	  mail	  rather	  than	  merely	  hallucinate	  the	  mail	  your	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  mail.	  Here	  is	  how	  Peter	  Strawson	  puts	  it:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  One	  might	  want	  to	  complicate	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  idea	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  perceptual	  experiences	  lack	  presentational	  phenomenology	  with	  respect	  to	  some	  of	  their	  content.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  the	  formulation	  given	  will	  do.	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  presentational	  phenomenology	  see	  (Chudnoff	  2011	  and	  	  2012.	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The	  thought	  of	  my	  fleeting	  perception	  as	  a	  perception	  of	  a	  continuously	  and	  independently	  existing	  thing	  implicitly	  contains	  the	  thought	  that	  if	  the	  thing	  had	  not	  been	  there,	  I	  should	  not	  even	  have	  seemed	  to	  perceive	  it.	  It	  really	  should	  be	  obvious	  that	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  independently	  existing	  objects	  and	  perceptual	  awareness	  of	  objects	  we	  already	  have	  the	  general	  notion	  of	  causal	  dependence	  of	  the	  latter	  on	  the	  former,	  even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  to	  which	  we	  give	  much	  reflective	  attention	  in	  our	  pre-­‐theoretical	  days.	  (Strawson	  1979	  reprinted	  in	  Dancy	  1988	  pgs	  103	  –	  104)	  	  It	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  that	  this	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  answer.	  While	  the	  causal	  condition	  might	  be	  necessary	  for	  perception,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  For	  any	  given	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  yours	  is	  caused	  by	  events	  in	  your	  brain,	  but	  most	  of	  your	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  not	  perceptions	  of	  events	  in	  your	  brain.	  We	  will	  not	  try	  to	  specify	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  perception	  here.	  	  	  	   In	  general,	  then,	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  a	  genuine	  perception	  rather	  than	  a	  mere	  hallucination	  only	  if	  it	  meets	  a	  causal	  condition:	  	  	   If	  your	  perceptual	  experience	  representing	  that	  p	  is	  a	  genuine	  perception	  that	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  partly	  because	  the	  items	  in	  your	  environment	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  p	  is	  true	  cause	  your	  perceptual	  experience.	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The	  first	  feature	  of	  perception	  characterizes	  its	  phenomenology.	  This	  second	  feature	  of	  perception	  characterizes	  its	  metaphysical	  structure,	  specifically	  how	  it	  is	  hooked	  up	  to	  its	  subject	  matter.	  	  Proponents	  of	  perceptualist	  views	  of	  intuition	  can	  appeal	  to	  these	  two	  features	  in	  specifying	  more	  exactly	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  mathematical	  intuition	  and	  perception.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  mathematical	  intuitions	  are	  phenomenologically	  like	  perceptions	  in	  possessing	  presentational	  phenomenology,	  but	  metaphysically	  different	  from	  perceptions	  in	  not	  hooking	  up	  to	  their	  subject	  matter	  causally.	  Anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  defend	  such	  a	  view	  must	  explain	  two	  things.	  The	  first	  is	  how	  your	  mathematical	  intuitions	  make	  their	  subject	  matter	  seem	  present	  to	  you	  given	  that	  it	  is	  not	  by	  representing	  it	  as	  standing	  before	  you	  in	  your	  immediate	  environment—e.g.	  as	  mail	  is	  represented,	  when	  it	  appears	  sitting	  there	  in	  your	  mailbox.	  The	  second	  is	  how	  your	  mathematical	  intuitions	  hook	  up	  to	  their	  subject	  matter	  given	  that	  their	  subject	  matter—e.g.	  circularity—is	  abstract	  and	  so	  causally	  inert.	  	  	   3.	  Kantian	  Views	  	  	   In	  broad	  outline,	  Kant’s	  view	  of	  mathematical	  intuition	  has	  been	  more	  influential	  on	  both	  the	  philosophical	  and	  the	  mathematical	  tradition	  than	  that	  of	  any	  other	  writer.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  sketch	  his	  view,	  relate	  it	  to	  the	  perceptualist	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  intuition,	  and	  briefly	  discuss	  its	  influence	  on	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early	  twentieth	  century	  developments	  in	  the	  foundations	  of	  mathematics.	  The	  first	  order	  of	  business	  will	  be	  to	  calibrate	  some	  terminology.	  	  	   Suppose	  you	  come	  to	  know	  by	  intuition	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  perceptualist	  would	  say:	  	   -­‐ You	  have	  an	  intuition.	  -­‐ It	  makes	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	  	  -­‐ And	  in	  it	  you	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  items	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  is	  true	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters.	  	  	  Kant	  also	  makes	  a	  threefold	  distinction	  corresponding	  to	  the	  seeming,	  the	  awareness,	  and	  the	  whole	  experience	  that	  combines	  them,	  but	  he	  uses	  different	  terminology.	  He	  writes:	  	  	   Our	  cognition	  arises	  from	  two	  fundamental	  sources	  in	  the	  mind,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  is	  the	  reception	  of	  representations	  (the	  receptivity	  of	  impressions),	  the	  second	  the	  faculty	  for	  cognizing	  an	  object	  by	  means	  of	  these	  representations	  (spontaneity	  of	  concepts);	  through	  the	  former	  an	  object	  is	  
given	  to	  us,	  through	  the	  latter	  it	  is	  thought	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  representation…Intuition	  and	  concepts	  therefore	  constitute	  the	  elements	  of	  all	  our	  cognition,	  so	  that	  neither	  concepts	  without	  intuition	  corresponding	  to	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them	  in	  some	  way	  nor	  intuition	  without	  concepts	  can	  yield	  a	  cognition.	  (Kant	  1999	  pg	  193;	  A50/B74).	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  if	  we	  were	  to	  use	  Kantian	  terminology,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  the	  seeming	  is	  a	  thought,	  the	  awareness	  is	  an	  intuition,	  and	  the	  whole	  that	  combines	  them	  is	  a	  cognition.	  Kant	  uses	  “intuition”	  for	  a	  part;	  I	  have	  been	  using	  “intuition”	  for	  the	  whole.	  In	  talking	  about	  Kant,	  I	  will	  use	  “mathematical	  intuition”	  for	  the	  whole/cognition	  in	  Kant’s	  sense,	  “intuitive	  awareness”	  for	  the	  awareness	  part/intuition	  in	  Kant’s	  sense,	  and	  “intuitive	  seeming”	  for	  the	  seeming	  part/that	  which	  corresponds	  to	  thought	  in	  a	  cognition	  for	  Kant.	  	  	   Kant	  defends	  the	  following	  four	  theses	  about	  intuitive	  awareness:	  	  	   (1) Intuitive	  awareness—in	  us—depends	  on	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensation.	  	  	  Kant	  repeats	  (1)	  throughout	  the	  Critique,	  for	  example:	  “Objects	  are	  therefore	  given	  to	  us	  by	  means	  of	  sensibility,	  and	  it	  alone	  affords	  us	  intuitions…”	  (Kant	  1999	  pg	  172;	  A19/B33).	  Kant	  believed	  this	  holds	  for	  us,	  but	  not	  for	  God.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  God	  creates	  the	  objects	  of	  his	  intuitive	  awareness,	  whereas	  we	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  intuitive	  awareness.	  As	  we’ll	  see,	  however,	  creation	  and	  affection	  are	  not	  the	  only	  options.	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(2) Our	  capacity	  for	  sensation	  imposes	  forms	  on	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  intuitive	  awareness;	  space	  is	  the	  form	  of	  intuitable	  objects	  outside	  of	  us;	  time	  is	  the	  form	  of	  all	  intuitable	  objects.	  	  This	  claim	  draws	  together	  a	  number	  of	  points	  developed	  in	  the	  Transcendental	  Aesthetic	  section	  of	  the	  Critique;	  (Kant	  199	  pgs	  155	  -­‐	  192;	  A20	  –	  A49/B34	  –	  B73).	  	  	   (3 Mathematical	  subject	  matter—space	  and	  time	  themselves—must	  conform	  to	  the	  forms	  that	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensation	  imposes	  on	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  intuitive	  awareness.	  	  This	  claim	  is	  associated	  with	  Kant’s	  “Copernican	  Revolution.”	  Here	  is	  a	  quote	  from	  the	  introduction	  where	  he	  sketches	  the	  main	  idea:	  “If	  intuition	  has	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  objects,	  then	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  we	  can	  know	  anything	  of	  them	  a	  
priori;	  but	  if	  the	  object…conforms	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  our	  faculty	  of	  intuition,	  then	  I	  can	  very	  well	  represent	  this	  possibility	  to	  myself.	  (Kant	  1999	  pg.	  110;	  Bxvi	  –	  Bxvii);	  see	  also	  (Kant	  1999	  pg	  176;	  B41).	  Note	  that	  an	  object’s	  conforming	  to	  the	  forms	  imposed	  on	  objects	  of	  our	  intuitive	  awareness	  is	  a	  different	  relation	  between	  it	  and	  intuitive	  awareness	  than	  either	  creation	  or	  affection.	  In	  creation	  the	  object	  causally	  depends	  on	  the	  mind;	  in	  affection	  the	  mind	  causally	  depends	  on	  the	  object.	  In	  the	  conforming	  relation	  Kant	  invokes	  the	  object	  non-­‐causally	  depends	  on	  the	  mind.	  So	  Kant	  recognized	  a	  third	  possibility.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  will	  consider	  a	  fourth.	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(4) We	  are	  intuitively	  aware	  of	  mathematical	  subject	  matter	  via	  illustrations	  that	  draw	  on	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensation.	  	  	  Kant	  develops	  this	  point	  in	  the	  section	  of	  the	  Critique	  on	  the	  Discipline	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  in	  its	  Dogmatic	  Use.	  He	  takes	  the	  case	  of	  reasoning	  about	  triangularity	  as	  an	  example:	  “Thus	  I	  construct	  a	  triangle	  by	  exhibiting	  an	  object	  corresponding	  to	  this	  concept,	  either	  through	  mere	  imagination,	  in	  pure	  intuition,	  or	  on	  paper,	  in	  empirical	  intuition…”	  (Kant	  1999	  pg.	  630;	  A713/B741).	  	  	   Recall	  that	  the	  first	  thing	  any	  perceptualist	  must	  explain	  is	  how	  mathematical	  intuitions	  make	  their	  subject	  matter	  seem	  present	  in	  intuitive	  awareness.	  From	  theses	  (1)	  and	  (4),	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Kant’s	  view	  is	  that	  mathematical	  intuitions	  do	  this	  via	  sensory	  illustration.	  The	  Kantian	  view	  of	  presentational	  phenomenology	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  mathematical	  intuitions	  might	  be	  put	  like	  this:	  	  	   Whenever	  you	  have	  a	  mathematical	  intuition	  representing	  that	  p	  your	  mathematical	  intuition	  also	  makes	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  as	  if	  you	  are	  intuitively	  aware	  of	  the	  items	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  p	  is	  true	  and	  it	  does	  so	  via	  sensory	  illustration	  of	  them.	  	  	  This	  is	  different	  from	  Felix	  Klein’s	  view	  because	  Kant	  thinks	  that	  mathematical	  intuitions	  do	  make	  us	  intuitively	  aware	  of	  mathematical	  subject	  matter.	  It	  is	  just	  that	  they	  always	  do	  this	  via	  sensory	  illustration.	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   The	  second	  thing	  any	  perceptualist	  must	  explain	  is	  how	  mathematical	  intuitions	  hook	  up	  to	  their	  subject	  matter.	  From	  (2)	  and	  (3),	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Kant’s	  view	  is	  that	  mathematical	  intuitions	  do	  this	  because	  mathematical	  subject	  matter	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  forms	  imposed	  on	  objects	  of	  our	  intuitive	  awareness.	  The	  Kantian	  view	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  mathematical	  intuition	  might	  be	  put	  like	  this:	  	  	   If	  your	  mathematical	  intuition	  representing	  that	  p	  is	  a	  genuine	  (i.e.	  knowledge	  grounding)	  mathematical	  intuition	  that	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  partly	  because	  the	  items	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  p	  is	  true	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  forms	  imposed	  on	  objects	  of	  our	  intuitive	  awareness.	  	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  imagining	  a	  triangle,	  say,	  is	  a	  guide	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  triangularity,	  not	  because	  triangularity	  somehow	  influences	  our	  imagination	  or	  our	  imagination	  somehow	  influences	  triangularity,	  but	  because	  there	  are	  formal	  constraints	  on	  how	  we	  can	  imagine	  things	  and	  triangularity	  must	  also	  meet	  these	  formal	  constraints.	  Now	  one	  might	  wonder:	  how	  did	  we	  get	  so	  lucky,	  so	  that	  the	  formal	  constraints	  on	  how	  we	  imagine	  things	  are	  also	  constraints	  mathematical	  subject	  matter	  must	  meet?	  But	  there	  is	  no	  luck	  involved.	  Kant	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  idealist.	  Mathematical	  subject	  matter,	  at	  least	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  knowable	  by	  us,	  is	  dependent	  on	  our	  minds—it	  lies	  in	  its	  nature	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  same	  constraints	  that	  govern	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensation.	  	  	   Kant’s	  view	  of	  mathematical	  intuition	  influenced	  early	  twentieth	  century	  developments	  in	  the	  foundations	  of	  mathematics.	  No	  major	  contributor	  to	  these	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developments	  accepted	  all	  that	  Kant	  thought	  about	  mathematical	  intuition.	  What	  most	  contributors	  accepted	  is	  the	  following	  general	  idea:	  	  	   (K) Our	  capacity	  for	  sensory	  representation	  limits	  our	  capacity	  for	  intuitive	  awareness.	  	  	  Different	  writers	  make	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  limits	  more	  exact	  in	  different	  ways.	  For	  discussion	  see	  the	  works	  by	  Brouwer	  and	  Hilbert	  in	  (Benacerraf	  and	  Putnam	  1983),	  the	  articles	  on	  intuitionism	  and	  formalism	  in	  (Schapiro	  2007),	  and	  (Parsons	  1979,	  2008).	  	  	   	  (K)’s	  implications	  for	  the	  foundations	  of	  mathematics	  emerge	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  continuum	  of	  real	  numbers.	  Real	  analysis	  as	  developed	  in	  a	  standard	  textbook	  depends	  on	  reasoning	  about	  arbitrary	  sets	  of	  real	  numbers.	  Simple	  sets	  of	  real	  numbers	  do	  not	  obviously	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  (K).	  Arguably,	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensory	  representation	  enables	  us	  to	  illustrate	  the	  real	  numbers	  in	  the	  unit	  interval	  [0,	  1]:	  just	  imagine	  a	  line	  segment.	  But	  there	  are	  two	  worries.	  First,	  this	  illustration	  can	  be	  very	  misleading	  about	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  unit	  interval.	  It	  might	  suggest,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  unit	  interval	  cannot	  be	  mapped	  onto	  the	  unit	  square,	  though	  really	  it	  can	  be.	  Second,	  once	  you	  admit	  the	  unit	  interval,	  more	  complicated	  sets	  of	  real	  numbers	  follow	  in	  its	  wake.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  set	  of	  real	  numbers	  that	  remains	  after	  the	  infinite	  process	  of	  first	  removing	  the	  middle	  third	  of	  the	  unit	  interval,	  the	  middle	  thirds	  of	  the	  two	  remaining	  intervals	  (i.e.	  [0,	  1/3]	  and	  [2/3,	  1],	  the	  middle	  thirds	  of	  the	  four	  remaining	  intervals	  (i.e.	  [0,1/9],	  [2/9,	  1/3],	  [2/3],	  7/9],	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and	  [8/9,	  1]),	  etc.	  This	  is	  the	  Cantor	  Set.	  Even	  if	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensory	  representation	  enables	  us	  to	  illustrate	  the	  first	  few	  stages	  of	  the	  process	  that	  generates	  the	  Cantor	  Set,	  the	  Cantor	  Set	  itself	  defies	  illustration.	  The	  unit	  interval	  and	  the	  Cantor	  Set	  are	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  illustration,	  but	  both	  are	  perfectly	  good	  sets	  of	  real	  numbers	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  standard	  real	  analysis.	  	  	   So	  intuitive	  awareness	  that	  conforms	  to	  (K)	  seems	  both	  unreliable	  about	  at	  least	  some	  of	  those	  mathematical	  objects	  it	  does	  represent	  and	  limited	  in	  what	  mathematical	  objects	  it	  can	  represent.	  	  	   The	  three	  great	  early	  twentieth	  century	  schools	  of	  thought	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  mathematics	  represent	  different	  reactions	  to	  the	  foregoing.	  Logicists	  tended	  to	  reject	  mathematical	  intuition	  as	  a	  source	  of	  mathematical	  knowledge.	  Intuitionists	  tended	  to	  reject	  the	  parts	  of	  standard	  mathematics—e.g.	  standard	  real	  analysis—that	  seemed	  to	  raise	  problems	  for	  mathematical	  intuition.	  Formalists	  tended	  to	  divide	  mathematics	  into	  a	  “real”	  part	  to	  which	  mathematical	  intuition	  has	  access	  and	  about	  which	  it	  is	  reliable,	  and	  an	  “unreal”	  part	  that	  must	  be	  developed	  in	  formal	  systems.	  See	  (Benacerraf	  and	  Putnam	  1983)	  for	  primary	  readings,	  and	  (Schapiro	  2007)	  for	  helpful	  secondary	  readings.	  	  	   There	  is	  another	  possible	  reaction.	  That	  is	  to	  give	  up	  (K).	  Consider	  the	  Cantor	  Set	  again.	  Don’t	  try	  to	  picture	  it,	  but	  just	  think	  about	  it	  and	  consider	  the	  question:	  does	  it	  contain	  any	  points?	  It	  should	  seem	  clear	  that	  it	  does.	  But	  this	  seeming	  does	  not	  derive	  from	  any	  illustration	  you	  might	  possess	  of	  the	  Cantor	  Set,	  since	  there	  is	  none.	  Rather,	  it	  derives	  from	  your	  thinking	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Cantor	  Set.	  It	  is	  a	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seeming	  based	  on	  thought,	  not	  sensory	  representation.	  One	  idea,	  then,	  is	  to	  develop	  an	  account	  of	  mathematical	  intuition	  according	  to	  which	  at	  least	  some	  mathematical	  intuitions	  are	  cognitive	  and	  not	  limited	  by	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensory	  representation.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐Kantian	  view	  of	  mathematical	  intuition.	  It	  is	  not	  really	  a	  reaction	  to	  Kant	  or	  Kantian	  views;	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  return	  to	  a	  Pre-­‐Kantian	  view	  of	  intuition	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Plato.	  	  	   4.	  Platonist	  Views	  	  	   Though	  in	  outline	  the	  view	  of	  intuition	  we	  will	  consider	  in	  this	  section	  has	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  adherents,	  Descartes	  put	  it	  in	  its	  modern	  form.	  For	  our	  purposes	  two	  points	  are	  crucial.	  	  	   First,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Kant,	  Descartes	  argues	  that	  the	  natures	  of	  mathematical	  objects	  are	  independent	  of	  our	  minds:	  	  	   When,	  for	  example,	  I	  imagine	  a	  triangle,	  even	  if	  perhaps	  no	  such	  figure	  exists,	  or	  has	  ever	  existed	  anywhere	  outside	  of	  my	  thought,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  determinate	  nature,	  or	  essence,	  or	  form	  of	  the	  triangle	  which	  is	  immutable	  and	  eternal,	  and	  not	  invented	  by	  me	  or	  dependent	  on	  my	  mind.	  (Descartes	  1985b	  pg	  45;	  AT	  64).	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So	  if	  we	  are	  intuitively	  aware	  of	  triangularity	  it	  is	  not	  because	  it	  affects	  us,	  we	  create	  it,	  or	  it	  must	  conform	  to	  forms	  determined	  by	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensation.	  There	  must	  be	  some	  fourth	  relation.	  	  	   Second,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Kant,	  Descartes	  argues	  that	  intuitive	  awareness	  is	  independent	  of	  our	  capacity	  for	  sensation—even	  if	  it	  sometimes	  involves	  sensory	  experiences.	  	  	  	   [a]	  But	  if	  I	  want	  to	  think	  of	  a	  chiliagon,	  although	  I	  understand	  that	  it	  is	  a	  figure	  consisting	  of	  a	  thousand	  sides	  just	  as	  well	  as	  I	  understand	  the	  triangle	  to	  be	  a	  three-­‐sided	  figure,	  I	  do	  not	  in	  the	  same	  way	  imagine	  the	  thousand	  sides	  or	  see	  them	  as	  if	  they	  were	  present	  before	  me.	  [b]	  It	  is	  true	  that	  since	  I	  am	  in	  the	  habit	  of	  imagining	  something	  whenever	  I	  think	  of	  a	  corporeal	  thing,	  I	  may	  construct	  in	  my	  mind	  a	  confused	  representation	  of	  some	  figure…(Descartes	  1985b	  pg	  50;	  AT	  72)	  [c]	  In	  fact	  we	  have	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  whole	  figure	  [i.e.	  the	  chiliagon],	  even	  though	  we	  cannot	  imagine	  it	  in	  its	  entirety	  all	  at	  once.	  And	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  that	  the	  powers	  of	  understanding	  and	  imagining	  do	  not	  differ	  merely	  in	  degree	  but	  are	  two	  quite	  different	  kinds	  of	  mental	  operation.	  (Descartes	  1985b	  pg	  264;	  AT	  385).	  	  	  In	  [a]	  Descartes’s	  chiliagon	  serves	  the	  same	  purpose	  as	  the	  Cantor	  Set	  above.	  In	  [b]	  Descartes	  notes	  that	  our	  thought	  might	  be	  associated	  with	  imagery.	  And	  in	  [c]	  Descartes	  emphasizes—in	  reply	  to	  Gassendi—that	  there	  is	  more	  than	  just	  imagery;	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there	  is	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  chiliagon	  based	  on	  thought	  and	  independent	  of	  imagery.	  	  	   What	  all	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  the	  Platonist	  must	  offer	  non-­‐Kantian	  explanations	  of	  how	  mathematical	  intuitions	  make	  their	  subject	  matter	  seem	  present,	  and	  in	  good	  cases	  succeed	  in	  hooking	  up	  to	  it.	  	  	   One	  difficulty	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  awareness	  based	  on	  thought	  can	  seem	  confused.	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  thinking	  about	  something	  and	  being	  aware	  of	  it.	  You	  can	  think	  about	  all	  sorts	  of	  things	  that	  you	  are	  not	  aware	  of—e.g.	  the	  center	  of	  the	  sun.	  When	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  sensory	  awareness,	  this	  contrast	  is	  obvious.	  But	  what	  does	  the	  contrast	  consist	  in	  when	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  awareness	  based	  on	  thought?	  What	  could	  being	  aware	  of	  an	  object	  by	  thinking	  about	  it	  be	  other	  than	  just	  thinking	  about	  it?	  	  	   To	  get	  a	  handle	  on	  this	  issue,	  we	  must	  distinguish	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  thought.	  Suppose	  you	  are	  alone	  in	  your	  hotel	  room	  in	  France	  and	  you	  think:	  	  	   (1) The	  tallest	  man	  in	  France	  is	  over	  6ft	  tall.	  	  	  Then	  you	  step	  outside	  and	  see	  a	  man	  who	  happens	  to	  be—though	  of	  course	  you	  do	  not	  know	  this—the	  tallest	  man	  in	  France,	  and	  you	  think:	  	  	   (2) That	  man	  is	  over	  6ft	  tall.	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Even	  though	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  attribute	  the	  same	  property	  to	  the	  same	  guy,	  call	  him	  Jacques,	  they	  are	  quite	  different	  in	  nature.	  (1)	  attributes	  a	  property	  to	  Jacques	  because	  it	  attributes	  a	  property	  to	  whoever	  is	  the	  tallest	  man	  in	  France	  and	  Jacques	  is	  the	  tallest	  man	  in	  France.	  It	  picks	  Jacques	  out	  by	  description	  and	  is	  a	  descriptive	  thought.	  (2)	  attributes	  a	  property	  to	  Jacques	  because	  it	  is	  a	  thought	  you	  have	  that	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  Jacques	  himself.	  It	  picks	  Jacques	  out	  by	  demonstration	  and	  is	  a	  demonstrative	  thought.	  	  	   Notice	  that	  you	  couldn’t	  have	  entertained	  (2)	  had	  you	  not	  been	  visually	  aware	  of	  Jacques.	  Your	  awareness	  of	  Jacques	  is	  what	  enabled	  you	  to	  entertain	  a	  demonstrative	  thought	  about	  him.	  And	  this	  is	  a	  special	  property	  of	  awareness:	  being	  aware	  of	  something—visually	  or	  otherwise—enables	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  that	  thing.3	  Now	  we	  can	  say	  what	  awareness	  based	  on	  thought	  is.	  If	  just	  by	  thinking	  about	  something	  enough—descriptively	  at	  first—you	  get	  yourself	  into	  a	  position	  to	  entertain	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  that	  thing	  where	  before	  you	  were	  not	  in	  such	  a	  position,	  then	  you	  have	  succeeded	  in	  attaining	  an	  awareness	  of	  that	  thing	  that	  is	  based	  on	  thought.	  	  	   So	  far	  we	  have	  been	  considering	  what	  awareness	  based	  on	  thought	  could	  be.	  But	  we	  still	  have	  to	  say	  something	  about	  its	  phenomenology	  and	  how	  it	  hooks	  you	  up	  to	  the	  object	  of	  awareness.	  About	  the	  first	  issue,	  let	  us	  note	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  seeming	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  that	  enables	  demonstrative	  thought.	  Suppose	  when	  you	  step	  out	  of	  your	  room	  you	  do	  not	  really	  see	  Jacques	  but	  only	  hallucinate	  a	  very	  tall	  man.	  Your	  experience	  makes	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  as	  if	  you	  can	  pick	  someone	  out	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	  claim	  should	  be	  qualified	  in	  various	  ways.	  For	  discussion	  see	  (Snowdon	  and	  Robinson	  1990),	  (Siegel	  2006),	  (Johnston	  2004),	  and	  (Tye	  2010).	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demonstration,	  but	  really	  you	  cannot.	  A	  similar	  thing	  can	  happen	  with	  thought.	  So	  if	  we	  want	  to	  say	  what	  it	  feels	  like	  from	  the	  inside	  to	  seem	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  a	  mathematical	  intuition,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  it	  feels	  like	  being	  in	  a	  state	  that	  enables	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  that	  object:	  	  	   Whenever	  you	  have	  a	  mathematical	  intuition	  representing	  that	  p	  your	  mathematical	  intuition	  also	  makes	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  as	  if	  you	  are	  intuitively	  aware	  of	  the	  items	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  p	  is	  true,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  in	  virtue	  of	  making	  it	  seem	  to	  you	  as	  if	  you	  are	  in	  a	  state	  that	  enables	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  those	  items.	  	  	  Notice	  that	  this	  characterization	  of	  the	  presentational	  phenomenology	  found	  in	  mathematical	  intuition	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  sometimes	  it	  substantively	  relies	  on	  imagery,	  sometimes	  it	  is	  merely	  accompanied	  by	  imagery,	  and	  sometimes	  it	  occurs	  without	  imagery	  at	  all	  and	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  pure	  thinking.	  This	  is	  just	  as	  the	  Platonist	  should	  expect.	  	  	   Descartes	  does	  not	  discuss	  how	  intuitive	  awareness	  relates	  to	  its	  objects	  in	  detail,	  and	  what	  he	  says	  is	  misleading.	  When	  he	  discusses	  the	  “eternal	  truths”	  in	  his	  
Principles	  of	  Philosophy,	  for	  example,	  he	  describes	  them	  as	  having	  “no	  existence	  outside	  our	  thought”	  and	  says	  of	  an	  example—that	  nothing	  comes	  from	  nothing—that	  it	  “resides	  within	  our	  mind.”	  (Descartes	  1985a	  pg	  208	  –	  209;	  AT	  23	  –	  24).	  This	  makes	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  intuitive	  awareness	  should	  be	  assimilated	  to	  introspective	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awareness!	  Aside	  from	  its	  prima	  facie	  implausibility,	  it	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  mathematical	  objects	  are	  mind-­‐independent	  with	  which	  we	  began	  this	  section.	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  another	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  idea.	  Plotinus,	  for	  example,	  calls	  (a	  part	  of)	  abstract	  reality	  Intellect	  and	  his	  view	  of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  us	  finite	  creatures	  to	  exercise	  our	  intellectual	  capacities	  is	  for	  us	  to	  be	  in	  accord	  with	  Intellect:	  	   	  	   The	  activities	  of	  Intellect	  are	  from	  above	  just	  as	  the	  activities	  arising	  from	  sense-­‐perception	  are	  from	  below.	  We	  are	  this—the	  principal	  part	  of	  the	  soul,	  in	  the	  middle	  between	  two	  powers…Intellect	  is	  disputed,	  because	  we	  do	  not	  always	  use	  it,	  and	  because	  it	  is	  separate.	  And	  it	  is	  separate	  owing	  to	  its	  not	  inclining	  toward	  us,	  whereas	  we	  rather	  are	  looking	  upward	  to	  it.	  Sense-­‐perception	  is	  our	  messenger,	  but	  Intellect	  “is	  our	  king.”	  	  But	  we	  are	  kings,	  too,	  whenever	  we	  are	  in	  accord	  with	  Intellect.	  We	  can	  be	  in	  accord	  with	  it	  in	  two	  ways:	  either	  by	  having,	  in	  a	  way,	  its	  writings	  written	  in	  us	  like	  laws	  or	  by	  being,	  in	  a	  way,	  filled	  up	  with	  it	  and	  then	  being	  able	  to	  see	  it	  or	  perceive	  it	  as	  being	  present.	  (From	  the	  Enneads	  excerpted	  in	  Dillon	  and	  Gerson	  2004	  pgs	  89	  –	  90).	  	  	  	  Intellect	  is	  not	  something	  that	  we	  create,	  nor	  something	  that	  affects	  us,	  nor	  something	  that	  must	  conform	  to	  forms	  determined	  by	  us.	  Rather	  Intellect	  is	  something	  that	  we	  conform	  to	  insofar	  as	  we	  succeed	  in	  exercising	  our	  intellectual	  capacities,	  such	  as	  the	  capacity	  for	  intuitive	  awareness	  of	  mathematical	  objects.	  So	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the	  fourth	  way	  for	  intellectual	  awareness	  to	  relate	  to	  its	  object	  is	  to	  be	  non-­‐causally	  dependent	  on	  it.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  line	  that	  Platonists	  have	  historically	  taken.	  	  	   We	  can	  frame	  it	  like	  this:	  	  	   If	  your	  mathematical	  intuition	  representing	  that	  p	  is	  a	  genuine	  (i.e.	  knowledge	  grounding)	  mathematical	  intuition	  that	  p,	  then	  it	  is	  partly	  because	  it	  is	  non-­‐causally	  dependent	  on	  the	  items	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  p	  is	  true.	  	  	  	  One	  might	  wonder	  what	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  non-­‐causal	  dependence	  relation	  is.	  Plotinus	  presents	  an	  inspiring	  picture,	  but	  does	  not	  provide	  us	  with	  any	  real	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  our	  mathematical	  intuitions	  to	  be	  non-­‐causally	  dependent	  on	  their	  subject	  matter.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  issues	  that	  any	  Platonist	  about	  intuition	  must	  address.	  The	  next	  section	  sketches	  a	  proposal.	  	  	   5.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Intuition	  	  	   There	  are	  different	  ways	  for	  one	  thing	  to	  non-­‐causally	  depend	  on	  another.	  Our	  first	  aim,	  then,	  will	  be	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  right	  non-­‐causal	  dependence	  relation.	  After	  that,	  we	  will	  explore	  how	  intuition	  experiences	  might	  bear	  that	  relation	  to	  mathematical	  objects.	  	  	   Consider	  the	  following	  claims:	  	  	   (1) Xantippe	  became	  a	  widow	  because	  Socrates	  died.	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(2) My	  car	  is	  parked	  illegally	  because	  it	  is	  parked	  next	  to	  a	  fire	  hydrant.	  	  (3) This	  bicycle	  exists	  because	  these	  items	  are	  so	  arranged	  to	  enable	  locomotion	  on	  two	  wheels	  by	  pedaling.	  	  	  Xantippe’s	  widowhood	  depends	  on	  Socrates’	  death,	  but	  not	  because	  Socrates’	  death	  causes	  Xantippe’s	  widowhood.	  (1)	  is	  a	  non-­‐causal	  dependence	  claim.	  So	  are	  (2)	  and	  (3).	  	  	   Let	  us	  focus	  on	  (3).	  It	  is	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  form	  and	  matter	  explanation.	  It	  explains	  why	  an	  object	  of	  a	  certain	  kind—a	  bicycle—exists	  by	  citing	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  matter—a	  group	  of	  items	  such	  as	  pedals,	  wheels,	  seat,	  etc—possesses	  a	  certain	  form—being	  so	  arranged	  to	  enable	  locomotion	  on	  two	  wheels	  by	  pedaling.	  According	  to	  (3),	  the	  bicycle’s	  existence	  non-­‐causally	  depends	  on	  its	  matter	  possessing	  the	  right	  form.	  	  	   Suppose	  we	  want	  to	  give	  a	  form	  and	  matter	  explanation	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  mathematical	  intuition.	  For	  this	  to	  work,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  identify	  two	  things:	  the	  intuition’s	  matter	  and	  the	  intuition’s	  form.	  Consider	  the	  matter.	  Clearly	  it	  will	  not	  consist	  of	  physical	  items,	  such	  as	  pedals,	  wheels,	  and	  seat.	  Instead	  it	  will	  consist	  of	  other	  experiences,	  such	  as	  thoughts	  and	  imaginings.	  The	  idea	  that	  intuitions	  consist	  of	  other	  experiences	  derives	  from	  the	  phenomenologist,	  Edmund	  Husserl.	  He	  writes:	  	  	   In	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  narrower,	  ‘sensuous’	  perception,	  an	  object	  is	  directly	  apprehended	  or	  is	  itself	  present,	  if	  it	  is	  set	  up	  in	  an	  act	  of	  perception	  in	  a	  
straightforward	  manner.	  What	  this	  means	  is	  this:	  that	  the	  object	  is	  also	  an	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immediately	  given	  object	  in	  the	  sense	  that…it	  is	  not	  constituted	  in	  relational,	  connective,	  or	  otherwise	  articulated	  acts,	  acts	  founded	  on	  other	  acts	  which	  
bring	  other	  objects	  to	  perception…[In	  the	  case	  of	  awareness	  of	  “ideal	  objects”	  e.g.	  mathematical	  objects]	  new	  objects	  are	  based	  on	  older	  ones,	  they	  are	  
related	  to	  what	  appears	  in	  the	  basic	  acts.	  Their	  manner	  of	  appearance	  is	  essentially	  determined	  by	  this	  relation.	  We	  are	  here	  dealing	  with	  a	  sphere	  of	  objects,	  which	  can	  only	  show	  themselves	  ‘in	  person’	  in	  such	  founded	  acts.	  (Husserl	  2001	  pgs	  282	  -­‐	  283,	  italics	  in	  the	  original)	  	  	  According	  to	  Husserl,	  sensory	  awareness	  is	  different	  from	  what	  we	  are	  calling	  intuitive	  awareness	  in	  that	  sensory	  awareness	  can	  be	  a	  basic	  experience	  and	  intuitive	  awareness	  must	  be	  a	  non-­‐basic	  experience	  that	  is	  constituted	  out	  of	  other	  experiences,	  such	  as	  thoughts	  and	  imaginings.	  Seeing	  a	  hula-­‐hoop,	  for	  example,	  is	  not	  constituted	  out	  of	  other	  experiences.	  Becoming	  intuitively	  aware	  of	  circularity	  itself,	  however,	  is	  constituted	  out	  of	  other	  experiences,	  such	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  imagining	  concrete	  illustrations.	  	  	   Now	  consider	  the	  form—i.e.	  the	  form	  that	  some	  experiences	  must	  exhibit	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  an	  intuition	  that	  makes	  its	  subject	  aware	  of	  some	  mathematical	  object.	  We	  can	  take	  bicycles	  as	  a	  model.	  Their	  parts	  must	  exhibit	  a	  form	  that	  enables	  a	  certain	  physical	  activity,	  specifically	  locomotion	  on	  two	  wheels	  by	  pedaling.	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  we	  considered	  the	  connection	  between	  awareness	  of	  something	  and	  the	  enabling	  of	  a	  certain	  mental	  activity,	  specifically	  entertaining	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  that	  thing.	  So	  a	  natural	  idea	  is	  this:	  in	  order	  for	  some	  experiences	  to	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constitute	  an	  intuition	  that	  makes	  its	  subject	  aware	  of	  some	  mathematical	  object	  those	  experiences	  must	  exhibit	  a	  form	  that	  enables	  their	  subject	  to	  entertain	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  that	  mathematical	  object.	  	   Consider,	  then,	  the	  following	  possible	  form	  and	  matter	  explanation	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  mathematical	  intuition:	  	  	   (4) This	  mathematical	  intuition—e.g.	  that	  circles	  are	  symmetrical	  about	  their	  diameters—exists	  because	  these	  experiences—e.g.	  imagining	  folding	  circles	  over	  their	  diameters—are	  so	  arranged	  to	  enable	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  circularity.	  	  	  Suppose	  claim	  (4)	  is	  true	  of	  some	  particular	  intuition.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  intuition	  non-­‐casually	  depends	  on	  some	  experiences	  enabling	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  circularity.	  But	  experiences	  cannot	  enable	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  circularity	  if	  circularity	  does	  not	  exist	  (for	  recall:	  we	  are	  considering	  real	  demonstrative	  thought,	  not	  just	  seeming	  demonstrative	  thought).	  So	  the	  intuition	  non-­‐causally	  depends	  on	  circularity.	  And	  that	  is	  the	  result	  we	  were	  looking	  for.	  	  	   This	  is	  just	  a	  sketch	  of	  a	  proposal.	  One	  might	  wonder:	  What	  does	  “arranged”	  mean	  in	  (4)	  mean?	  Can	  we	  say	  more	  about	  what	  some	  experiences	  must	  be	  like	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  an	  abstract	  object?	  Why	  believe	  that	  we	  ever	  really	  entertain	  demonstrative	  thoughts	  about	  abstract	  object,	  instead	  of	  just	  seeming	  to	  do	  so?	  These	  are	  good	  questions.	  A	  fuller	  account	  should	  address	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them	  and	  others.	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  intuitive	  awareness	  along	  the	  lines	  pursued	  in	  this	  section	  see	  (Chudnoff	  forthcoming-­‐a	  and	  forthcoming-­‐b).	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